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Factors influencing Quality Threatening Behaviour in a Big Four Accounting Firm1 
 
1. Introduction 
Targets derived from a performance management system are used to motivate performance 
and encourage desirable employee behaviour.  According to prior research (Otley, 1987) 
targets should be set at an appropriate level and accepted by the individual to motivate 
behaviour congruent with the organization’s objectives.  Targets which are too difficult, or at 
least perceived as unattainable by the individual, are found to be counter-productive and lead 
to demotivated employees and/or dysfunctional behaviour to meet the target.  This is 
particularly the case when the main focus of appraisers in regular performance appraisals is 
on target achievement rather than on overall effectiveness (Hopwood, 1976).   
 
In the accounting firm literature, case study evidence (for example, Otley and Pierce, 1996b; 
Pierce and Sweeney, 2004) confirms that targets drive employee behaviour.  Studies within 
organizations have found examples of very tight time budgets (i.e. providing insufficient time 
to complete a task with due diligence) leading to various forms of dysfunctional employee 
behaviour, collectively termed ‘Quality Threatening Behaviour’ [QTB] (Pierce and Sweeney, 
2004).  The use of tight time budgets is a significant issue for accounting firms as high work 
quality is of paramount importance (since their reputation is built upon integrity and 
professionalism).  However the need to maintain costs within budget (as audit time is billed 
to the client) is also important for maintaining relationships with clients for repeat business 
(Power, 2003; Pierce and Sweeney, 2004).  Studies in this area generally find significant 
QTB to meet the target as evidenced in signing off prematurely on audit checks or skipping 
certain steps (Pierce and Sweeney, 2004; Coram, Ng and Woodliff, 2003).  They also find 
evidence of significant amounts of under-reported time as employees seek to complete their 
tasks with due diligence, but often in their own (unpaid) time (Sweeney and Pierce, 2006).  
This may not be dysfunctional in the short-term but may become so if the reported actuals 
become the standard for future periods (Bedard, Ettredge and Johnstone, 2008). 
 
Prior research has focused on the performance management systems in place at one 
hierarchical level and, in the case of the accounting firm literature (for example, Pierce and 
                                                            
1 Abbreviations used in this study are as follows: Quality Threatening Behavior (QTB) 
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Sweeney, 2004; Sweeney and Pierce, 2006), this has been almost exclusively at the more 
junior levels (audit juniors and seniors).2  At present we have little evidence of how a 
performance management system works across the entire hierarchy in the same organization, 
a factor identified in Ferreira and Otley (2009).  Our study of a Big Four accounting firm in 
the UK provides evidence on this issue.  Big Four accounting firms are very hierarchical in 
nature and represent an ideal organization to analyse the effects of the performance 
management system at different hierarchical levels.  This is the first study to our knowledge 
to pay particular attention to how organization hierarchical level affects employees’ response 
to the performance management system and to the factors that may reduce any dysfunctional 
behaviour evidenced.   
 
The consequences of dysfunctional behaviour to an accounting firm can be costly both for the 
individual and the firm, particularly in the post-Enron era. For example, it could lead to 
termination of employment for the individual, and damage to reputation and increased 
potential for litigation for the firm (Pierce and Sweeney, 2004, 2005). Evidence from prior 
studies (Alderman and Deitrick, 1982; Kelley and Seiler, 1982; Lightener, Leisenring and 
Winters, 1983; Kelley and Margheim, 1990; Raghunathan, 1991; Malone and Roberts, 1996; 
Otley and Pierce, 1996a; 1996b; Pierce and Sweeney, 2004; 2005) suggests a high incidence 
of dysfunctional behaviour among auditors has existed over a considerable period of time, 
and appeared to be increasing rather than decreasing.  The Enron debacle provided significant 
focus upon auditors and their integrity and therefore it is of significant interest to study 
dysfunctional behaviours in an audit firm following this event.   
 
Also, unlike prior studies of accounting firms, rather than focussing solely on the audit 
segment of the business which now represents under 40% of the Big Four accounting firms’ 
revenues in the UK (Accountancy Age, 2013), we include the non-audit segment in our 
analysis which enhances the generalizability of the results of our study to other organizations.  
Our study therefore captures behaviour in accounting firms which has previously gone 
unrecognised and this is an important part of accounting firms’ activities.  The audit section 
has a cost versus quality dilemma in determining the amount of work completed; the cost is 
measurable but the quality of work undertaken is difficult to identify.  However, this concern 
is less apparent in the non-audit section which operates more like other businesses in a 
                                                            
2 This has been justified by the fact audit seniors are at the mid-point in the hierarchy and are likely to be subject 
to considerable pressure from superiors (Kelley and Seiler, 1982).   
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competitive market.  Therefore incentives to engage in dysfunctional behaviour are expected 
to be different in non-audit work.  All employees who participated in this company survey are 
graduates and have followed a standard training route and therefore the non-audit section also 
provides a useful control for the results found in the audit section of the business.   
 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways: Firstly, by using case study 
evidence from responses from a company based web survey in a Big Four accounting firm 
we provide evidence on how targets influence employee behaviour.  We specifically focus on 
how hierarchical level and other organizational factors such as organizational commitment, 
perceptions of fairness and interaction with superiors may change employee behaviour.  Our 
analysis is more complete than prior studies as it also considers how employee characteristics 
(such as gender and length of time in job) make a difference to employee behaviour.  Second, 
we show evidence of the level of dysfunctional behaviour in a Big Four accounting firm in a 
post-Enron era, when it may be expected that dysfunctional behaviour in accounting firms 
would be reduced. This study is therefore timely in that it provides evidence on employee 
behaviour following a period of intense scrutiny of accounting firms’ activities.  Thirdly, to 
benchmark our results from the audit section and provide some insight into results of other 
business areas, we provide comparative results for both the audit and non-audit sections of 
the business whereas prior literature has focussed upon the audit section only.  Fourthly, we 
develop new questionnaire instruments for target-focussed  appraisal style and interactive 
control.  Finally, we adapt instruments from prior literature for this study and results confirm 
use of a reduced number of items for instruments from the existing literature provide reliable 
results.   
 
In summary our results show that the behavioural responses differ by hierarchical level.  The 
level of target and target focus of appraisers are both influential in employees’ decision to 
engage in QTB, but the effect is not universal across all hierarchical levels.  However, 
individuals with greater organizational commitment who perceive that they have been treated 
fairly by the organization, and have a superior who interacts with them regularly are less 
likely to engage in dysfunctional behaviour, although the strength of response differs by 




The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the literature and 
develops our hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the research method and data.  Section 4 
discusses our results and section 5 contains our conclusions. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
This study focussed on the relationship between performance management system and 
dysfunctional behaviour at all hierarchical levels.  Following Pierce and Sweeney (2004; 
2005; 2010), we use the term Quality Threatening Behaviour (QTB) to encompass a group of 
dysfunctional behaviours which have the potential to undermine the quality of work 
completed.  We specifically focus upon the following QTB: (i) excessive short-term focus at 
the expense of long term effectiveness (Anthony and Govindarjaran, 2004); (ii) taking actions 
which are ‘against an individual’s better judgement’ (Otley and Pierce, 1995); (iii) remaining 
in the office after hours (i.e. presenteeism); (iv) skipping necessary procedures to enable 
premature sign-off on a task (Otley and Pierce, 1996b); and (v) under-reporting of time on an 
allocated task and avoiding an unfavourable budget variance (Otley and Pierce, 1995; 
Sweeney and Pierce, 2006; Bedard et al. 2008). 
 
Whilst short-term consequences of presenteeism and under-recording of time may be 
perceived as non-dysfunctional, there can be longer term adverse consequences. Presenteeism 
can result in negative consequences in terms of more tired or stressed employees in the firm 
(Ng, Sorensen and Feldman, 2007).  It can have an adverse impact on productivity and the 
quality of work completed by an employee.  With regard to time budgets and under-reporting 
of time spent on a task, Sweeney and Pierce (2006) suggest that if budgets remain ‘time 
tight’, or even are cut down in hours in future years, this could result in QTB by future 
auditors to meet the target time for a particular task.  Other studies (e.g. Otley and Pierce, 
1995; Pierce and Sweeney, 2004) use under-reported time as a separate variable and for this 
reason, in sensitivity analysis we discuss models which evaluate the components of QTB 
separately.   
 
2.1. Target Difficulty and QTB 
Like many organizations, accounting firms use targets to motivate their employees and 
maximise performance consistent with organizational goals.  Prior research (for example, 
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Otley, 1987) suggests more challenging targets are accompanied by greater effort and 
achievement, providing the employee considers the target to be achievable.    However, there 
is an inherent problem of setting appropriate targets in accounting firms for the audit section; 
Whilst the engagement time and costs of auditing a client are measurable and easy to control 
(through time budgets i.e. budgets which provide employees a particular amount of time to 
carry out a task), employees’ work output and quality of work is less easy to observe, making 
it more difficult to measure and control (Otley and Pierce, 1996a).  Audit quality in such 
firms is of paramount importance, even over-riding commercial considerations.  However, 
like any other profit-oriented organization, professional accounting firms need to maintain 
commercial viability in order to continue functioning. In trying to improve profit and 
maintain commercial viability, a direct conflict ensues between doing high quality work and 
keeping costs down by limiting chargeable time. Consequently, the pressure of the cost-
quality conflict elicits a variety of QTB which may include under-reporting of time on audits, 
prematurely signing off an audit step, accepting weak client explanations, not fully 
investigating an accounting principle, and reducing the amount of work performed on an 
audit step (Pierce and Sweeney, 2004; Coram et al., 2003).  Bedard et al. (2008) suggest that 
even if adverse variances are reported by the audit engagement team, the following year some 
additional hours in the budget may be allocated, but this would remain at a level insufficient 
to complete the task, providing incentives for QTB.  Concerns regarding time allocated to 
clients may be less pressurized in the non-audit section of the business, although the 
temptation to engage in QTB to meet target outcomes is still expected to be present.  Based 
upon prior evidence, we predict:   
H1: there is a positive association between the level of target difficulty and QTB 
 
2.2 Target Focussed Performance Appraisal and QTB 
If the level of target taken as a given, the amount of emphasis placed upon the target by the 
appraiser in regular performance appraisals will also have implications for employee 
behaviour.  Prior research has found that target-focussed appraisers (i.e. superiors who are 
concerned with target achievement at all costs) can result in greater dysfunctional behaviour 
(Hopwood, 1972; Otley and Pierce, 1995; Sweeney and Pierce, 2004).  It would be expected 
that an accounting firm would be associated with tight focus on budgets and an inflexible 
approach to target achievement to maintain costs (Otley and Pierce, 1995; Sweeney and 
Pierce, 2004).  If this is the case, it is a natural response to take action to meet the target if 
this is the main aspect appraisers find important, irrespective of the longer term implications 
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of dysfunctional behaviour.  Given the unobservable nature of much of the auditors’ work 
and the problem of adequate monitoring of junior employees (Otley and Pierce, 1995), a 
target-focussed appraiser would likely result in audit employees exhibiting greater QTB to 
(apparently) meet the expected level of performance.  Based upon our prior discussion, we 
predict: 
H2: there is a positive association between the level of target focus by superiors in 
performance appraisal and QTB. 
 
2.3 Organizational Commitment and QTB 
Employees’ job satisfaction and positive feelings about the organization may be influential on 
the level of QTB used.  As mentioned earlier, auditors’ work quality is difficult to observe, 
hence increasing the importance of personnel and other forms of social controls (Otley and 
Pierce, 1996a).  Therefore having some type of commitment to the organization may 
persuade employees to engage in less QTB than they otherwise would.  Amongst audit 
seniors, Otley and Pierce (1996a) found lower dysfunctional behaviour where employees 
exhibited organizational commitment, although Malone and Roberts (1996) found no 
confirmatory evidence in support of this relationship.  We predict an acceptance of 
organizational values and a desire to maintain membership of the organization to be 
associated with a reduced level of QTB.   
H3: there is a negative association between the level of organizational commitment 
and QTB. 
 
2.4 Fairness in Treatment and QTB 
Employees’ behaviour may also be influenced by perceptions of fairness with regard to 
allocated tasks, and rewards and promotions received.  It is important that individuals feel 
that they have been treated fairly and are appropriately rewarded for their efforts.  In addition 
it is also important that individuals perceive that they have been treated equitably relative to 
other colleagues in the organization (Bol, 2011).  Individuals that perceive themselves to be 
rewarded fairly by the organization will be more satisfied in their role and are more likely to 
perform better (Janssen, 2001).  Conversely, individuals which perceive that they have been 
under-rewarded may actually adjust their effort levels and engage in undesirable behaviour 
(Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).  We would expect that greater perceived equity in treatment to be 
associated with a reduced level of QTB and predict: 




2.5 Interactions with Superiors and QTB 
Big Four accounting firms are very hierarchical; Partners provide the overall strategic 
direction and they work very closely with Directors who are the next lower level in the 
hierarchy.  Below them, Senior Managers and Managers provide guidance to the group of 
audit staff, termed Executives in this study.  Despite this hierarchical structure, the regular 
review meetings with superiors may promote greater interaction between junior and senior 
staff than is the case in many organizations.  Simons (1995) suggests interactive styles of 
management are important for encouraging desirable behaviour in subordinates and resolving 
uncertainty.  Interactions with subordinates provide the opportunity for dialogue and promote 
greater trust between superior and subordinate.  It can also engender a learning environment 
that values information sharing and new ideas from subordinates, and in addition it may 
provide support to resolve how to complete tasks with uncertainty.  Such interactions and 
approachable styles of superiors has previously been found to be associated with reduced 
QTB (Otley and Pierce, 1995).  We would expect that greater face-to-face interaction with 
and encouragement from superiors will be associated with a reduced level of dysfunctional 
behaviour and predict: 
H5: there is a negative association between the level of interaction with superiors and 
QTB. 
 
2.6 Organizational Hierarchical Level  
It is probable that organization hierarchical level makes a difference in how employees 
respond to the performance management system, but at present there is little evidence of this 
from the literature.  The Big Four accounting firm in our study has a very rigid hierarchy with 
distinct hierarchical levels.  Directors and Senior Managers, for example, will have more 
authority to meet the targets and take the necessary actions to reach those targets, resulting in 
greater task uncertainty, which needs to be taken into account in performance assessment.  
Executives on the other hand are primarily concerned with passing their professional 
examinations and Managers in the organization will be acutely aware of this factor.3  In such 
hierarchical organizations, inevitably pressure from more senior employees to meet targets 
gets transmitted down the organization.  Fixed fee audit contracts place pressure to get jobs 
                                                            
3 Inevitably this limits the amount of pressure that Managers can pass down the hierarchy, placing Managers at a 
critical point in the hierarchy; they are responsible for meeting the targets set and typically will lead field teams 
on audit engagements, but will be unable to review the quality of work completed (Otley and Pierce, 1995) or 
substantially pass down the cost-quality pressures they face. 
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done on time (i.e. within the allocation in the budget) and this pressure is felt throughout the 
organization (Carcello, Hermanson and Fenwick Huss, 1996).  Otley and Pierce (1996a) 
discovered audit seniors were more likely to under-report time rather than ask their manager 
for a larger time budget, indicating managers were reluctant to change budgets and that they 
pass pressure down the hierarchy.   
 
The time frame between actions taken and the realisation of the consequences of such actions 
are progressively longer in time frame higher up the hierarchy.  This would suggest that a 
different type of target and differing level of target-focus in appraisers is required at different 
hierarchical levels, with broader focussed performance appraisal being appropriate in more 
complex or uncertain environments.  At present we have only fragmented evidence of 
performance appraisal systems’ impact on employees at different levels in the organizational 
hierarchy and little knowledge of how the same system in one organization is operational at 
all hierarchical levels.  Given this limited prior evidence, we make no directional prediction 
for this hypothesis: 
H6: there is no difference in employee dysfunctional behaviour by organization 
hierarchical level. 
 
2.7 Audit and Non-Audit Services 
The provision of audit generates less than 40 % of revenues for the Big Four accounting firms 
and therefore the majority revenues are generated from non-audit services in the UK 
(Accountancy Age, 2013).  Therefore omission of non-audit services in studies of accounting 
firms therefore overlooks a significant part of the business.  Prior studies of employee 
dysfunctional behaviour have excluded the non-audit service part of the business, despite this 
functioning in a competitive market and operating similar to other organizations.  This is an 
important omission as employees in the non-audit service are graduates and have followed a 
standard training route (as in audit service).  In addition, they will be subject to cultural 
pressures and therefore have similar behavioural responses to employees in audit.  However, 
there may be less opportunity to engage in dysfunctional behaviour as the client is the 
company and there may be more opportunities for the client to detect dysfunctional employee 
behaviour in the accounting firm.  As we have no prior knowledge of how performance 
management systems will work in the non-audit services part of the accounting firm, we 
make no directional prediction for this hypothesis.  We predict: 
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H7: there is no difference in employee dysfunctional behaviour by line of service 
(audit or non-audit) 
 
We also investigate whether employee characteristics (age, gender, length of time in job and 
length of time working for the organization) make any difference to the above relationships.   
 
3. Method         
3.1 Sample and Survey Design 
We conducted our study in a regional office of a Big Four UK accounting firm; this firm is 
hierarchical in nature and has a substantial number of employees.  Following initial design of 
the questionnaire, pilot studies were completed with academics and a small sample of the 
firm’s employees.  The firm employee sample included representation from all divisions 
(audit, consultancy and tax) to ensure the terminology used was appropriate for all divisions.  
The final survey was web-based as this was the firm’s preferred mode of administration.  The 
final questions used were the outcome of several drafts and meetings with the organization to 
ensure it was congruent with the organization’s objectives and our study’s goals.  Working in 
an organization on a potentially sensitive issue resulted in re-design of the survey and 
constraints being placed upon us in terms of the number of items that could be used for each 
variable in the final survey instrument.  However, this does not appear to have impacted on 
the usefulness of responses, as described below with relation to the Cronbach alpha for each 
of our measures (see Table 1).  The Appendix lists, in the order that they are discussed in the 
paper, the survey questions and their related scales. 
Rather than focus on a particular hierarchical level, our survey was specifically designed to 
elicit responses from employees at all levels in the organization from support staff to 
directors.4  The employees were invited to take part in the survey in an email invitation from 
the regional Chairman.  The email explained the objectives of the survey and reinforced the 
anonymous nature of any responses received, except for the reporting of aggregate results to 
the firm.  In addition, there was a link to the survey provided within the email. The web-
based survey required a login and password to access the questionnaire which ensured that 
                                                            
4 In discussions with the performance management section of the organization it was agreed to omit partners 
from the questionnaire as they were few in number and it was considered inappropriate to include them for 
reasons of anonymity. 
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only respondents receiving the email invitation were able to access the survey and the 
integrity of the data were maintained.  The survey took approximately fifteen minutes to 
complete with responses for each section being saved as respondents completed the survey. 
3.2 Sample Statistics 
Over 1,000 employees were sent this survey and we received 236 complete responses.  This 
response rate is in line with that achieved by the firm when conducting its own staff survey 
questionnaires.  Of these 236 responses, 21 were from support staff and are excluded from 
our analysis as support staff’s time is not directly billable to clients.  Table 1 shows that the 
remaining 215 responses included in our analysis are from a variety of hierarchical levels (89 
are Associates or Executives; 60 are Managers; 52 are Senior Managers and 14 are 
Directors).  The Associate and Executive levels (termed audit juniors and seniors respectively 
in prior studies) are both pre-qualification level employees and face similar incentives within 
the organization; their primary goal is to successfully obtain professional qualification.  For 
this reason we treat them as the same hierarchical level, and both Executive and Associates 
are termed ‘Executives’ hereafter.  The respondents were split 42% from the audit division 
and 58% from the other non-audit divisions (tax and consultancy), and in terms of gender, 
60% of respondents were male and 40% female, in line with the demography of the regional 
office.   
- Table 1 - 
3.3 Definition and Measurement of Constructs 
Due to the constraints placed upon us by the organization, the length of our survey was 
restricted and therefore our instruments had to be adapted to suit this study.  Where possible, 
we based our measures on instruments used in previous studies with amendments particular 
to this case firm.5  We also developed new measures as required (for target focus and 
interactive control, see below).  Confirmatory factor analysis is used to test the 
dimensionality of our multi-item constructs to ensure they load positively on the same factor.  
We also use Cronbach alpha (α) to determine scale reliability (Cronbach, 1951).  
3.3.1 Quality Threatening Behaviour 
                                                            
5 When deciding to how to reduce the number of questionnaire items, we analysed the full instrument from the previous 
literature, removing duplicate items and for some items (e.g. for Fairness) we were asked to restate the questions in the 
positive form at the firm’s request.   
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We measure the incidence of QTB as the average of the responses a five item question.  
Respondents are invited to comment on their experiences and rate the frequency of their 
behaviours on a 5-point scale (scale: 1-5; from never to almost always) on the following five 
aspects: (i) taking short-term actions at the expense of the long-term (Anthony and 
Govindarjaran, 2004) [mean 2.56; S.D. 0.96], (ii) doing things which are against an 
individual’s better judgement (Otley and Pierce, 1995) [mean 2.38; S.D. 0.86], (iii) working 
longer hours to indicate an individual is working hard, i.e. a specific type of presenteeism 
[mean 2.75; S.D. 1.12], (iv) skipping necessary procedures (Otley and Pierce, 1996b) [mean 
2.17; S.D. 0.93] and (v) failing to record the full amount of time spent on a task, i.e. 
deliberate under-reporting of time (Otley and Pierce, 1995; Sweeney and Pierce, 2006; 
Bedard et al., 2008) [mean 3.13; S.D. 1.12].  The Cronbach alpha for QTB was 0.67.6  
 
3.3.2 Target Difficulty 
Target difficulty was measured using an item adapted from Kenis (1979) and is similar to 
Kelley and Margheim (1990).  Respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the 
statement ‘I should not have too much difficulty reaching my goals’ on a 7-point scale from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree [mean: 4.06; S.D. 1.31].  This item has been reverse coded 
so that higher scores are associated with greater levels of target difficulty.  Under hypothesis 
1, we expect Target Difficulty to be positively related to QTB. 
 
3.3.3 Target Focus  
The style of appraisal is based upon the extent to which appraisers rigidly use target 
achievement as a means of performance assessment.  We develop a new instrument 
containing nine items to identify the construct of target focused evaluative style which 
examines the balance of quantitative versus qualitative information in performance 
evaluation, the extent of short term focus and the level of reward congruence with target 
achievement (see Appendix).7  Respondents were asked to record their level of agreement 
with these statements relating to the level of target focussed evaluative style on a 7-point 
scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  Using confirmatory factor analysis we retain 
                                                            
6 Although this is below the usual threshold, as Schmitt (1996) comments this is not necessarily an impediment 
to the usefulness of the measure. 
7 To benchmark our results with prior studies, in sensitivity analysis we use a similar definition for Target Focus 
as Hopwood (1972).  The items included in this construct are included in the Appendix.  Results from using this 
measure are reported in sensitivity analysis. 
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three items for our construct which have factor loadings at or above 0.5.  The three items 
identified are strictly focussed on the short-term orientation of the appraiser and are coded 
such that they are increasing in target focus of the appraiser.  Target focus is then calculated 
as a simple average of the three items and has a Cronbach alpha of 0.81.  Under hypothesis 2, 
we expect Target Focus to be positively related to QTB.  
 
3.3.4 Organizational Commitment 
Organizational Commitment examines the individual’s commitment in terms of their concern 
for the organization and level of effort they are willing to put into tasks for the organization.  
Organizational Commitment was measured using four items with a 7-point measurement 
scale: strongly disagree to strongly agree.  These items are based upon an adapted instrument 
from Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979) and Parker and Kohlmeyer (2005).  Factor analysis 
confirmed one item did not load appropriately and so the final variable is measured as the 
average of three items. 8  Organizational Commitment has a Cronbach alpha of 0.83.  Under 
hypothesis 3, we expect Organizational Commitment to be negatively related to QTB. 
 
3.3.5 Fairness 
Fairness measures the extent to which an individual feels treated fairly by the organization in 
term of allocation of tasks, rewards and promotion.  Fairness was measured using five items 
with a 7-point measurement scale: strongly disagree to strongly agree.   These items are based 
upon Janssen (2001)9.  All items load positively on to the same factor.  Fairness is calculated 
as an average of the five items.  The Cronbach alpha for Fairness is 0.83.  Under hypothesis 
4, we expect Fairness to be negatively related to QTB. 
 
3.3.6 Interactive Control 
Interactive Control measures the level of face-to-face interaction with appraisers and 
encouragement from appraisers.  This is a new instrument based upon ideas from Simons 
(1995), Abernethy and Brownell (1999) and Chenhall (2003).  This differs from previous 
studies as it is measured from the perspective of subordinates in relation to their overall 
                                                            
8 Mowday et al. (1979) use a fifteen instrument to measure Organizational commitment.  Whilst we 
acknowledge that we use a parsimonious set of items for this concept compared with previous studies, the 
reliability of our construct seems unaffected. The Cronbach alpha of our instrument (0.83) is very similar to the 
Cronbach alpha of 0.85 reported by Parker and Kohlmeyer (2005) for the full scale. 
9 Janssen (2001, p.1042) uses a six item instrument to measure Fairness.  In our study this was modified to five 
items and the wording was modified to make all statements positive, as was agreed with the accounting firm.  
The Cronbach alpha of our instrument 0.83 compares favourably with the 0.90 reported by Janssen (2001).  
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formal performance evaluation.  Interactive Control was measured using four items with a 7-
point measurement scale: strongly disagree to strongly agree.   All four items load positively 
on to the same factor and Interactive Control is an average of all four items.  The Cronbach 
alpha for Interactive Control is 0.86.  Under hypothesis 5, we expect Interactive Control to 
be negatively related to QTB. 
 
3.3.7 Hierarchical Level and Division 
As noted earlier, we excluded Support Staff and Partner hierarchical levels from our study.  
Therefore four hierarchical levels are included: Executive, Manager, Senior Manager and 
Director.  We include separate dummy variables for each hierarchical level and the Executive 
category is treated as the base category in our regressions which include all hierarchical 
levels.  We also include a dummy variable to capture the division in which the individual 
works; Audit is coded ‘1’ for the audit division and ‘0’ for the tax and consultancy divisions.  
We have no directional hypothesis for relationship between QTB and hierarchical level, or 
QTB and Audit. 
 
3.3.8 Other variables 
We also control for the gender of respondents (Male), length of time in years employed in the 
role (Grade Tenure) and in the organization (Organization Tenure), and the respondent’s age 
(Age).  Male is a dummy variable coded 1 for male respondents and 0 for females.  Some 
prior research finds males are “potentially less sensitive to the ethical implications of various 
issues” (Bernardi and Arnold, 1997, p. 653) although Radtke (2000) finds no significant 
difference between males and females.   Therefore we make no prediction with regard to 
relationship between Male and QTB, but we believe this is a necessary control in our models.   
We provide no directional predictions for Age, Grade Tenure or Organization Tenure. 
 
3.4 Regression Model 
We estimate the following regression model of QTB 10: 
ۿ܂۰ ൌ 	܆઺ ൅ 	ܝ 
where: 
                                                            
10 Our main model uses our construct for QTB which is based upon five items (see Appendix for details).  In 
further analysis, we estimate models using the underlying components of QTB separately.  
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X is a vector of explanatory variables and u is the error term.   
Model 1 is the base model which includes the explanatory variables Target Difficulty, Target 
Focus, Organizational Commitment, Fairness and Interactive Control.  We also control for 
gender (Male), Grade Tenure, Organization Tenure and Age.  In addition to the variables 
from Model 1, Model 2 includes variables to capture the effects of hierarchical level 
(Manager and Senior Manager, Director) and division (Audit).  Our models are estimated 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression methods with standard errors robust to the 
presence of heteroskedasticity.  Our model is initially estimated using for the complete 
sample including all hierarchical levels.  We also estimate our model by hierarchical level 
separately (except for Directors as there are insufficient responses to complete a separate 
meaningful analysis for that hierarchical level), by division and also by gender.   The results 
are discussed in the next section. 
 
4. Results  
XX TABLE 1 XX 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for variables for the full sample which includes the 
mean and standard deviation, minimum and maximum (both theoretical and actual).  In 
addition, there are mean values by hierarchical level, division and gender.  QTB is 
significantly different across different hierarchical levels (p-value 0.04), with Managers 
responding with the greatest average level of QTB (mean: 2.72) and Directors with the lowest 
level of QTB (mean: 2.2).  However, we find no significant difference in the level of QTB 
between the divisions or in terms of gender of respondents.  Target Difficulty differs by 
hierarchical level (p-value 0.01) with Directors being assigned the most challenging targets 
(mean: 4.71) compared with Executives (mean: 3.71).  There is no significant difference 
across division in terms of Target Difficulty, but in an analysis of Target Difficulty and 
gender, it is apparent that men perceive their targets to be more challenging than women 
(mean of 4.22 for men compared with a mean of 3.81 for women; p-value = 0.03).  Target 
Focus has a mean of 2.89 and there is no statistically significant difference in Target Focus 
across hierarchical level, division or gender.  Organizational Commitment has an average of 
5.1 and this differs by hierarchical level (p-value = 0.01); Organizational Commitment 
increases with hierarchical level and Directors have the greatest Organizational Commitment 
(mean: 6.0).  There is no significant difference in Organizational Commitment by division or 
gender.  The mean perceived level of Fairness is 4.22 and this is not significantly different by 
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hierarchical level, division or gender.  Interactive Control has a mean of 4.46, with 
Executives having the greatest level of interaction with superiors (mean 4.73). 
 
The variable correlations are presented in Table 2.  Consistent with our hypothesis, Target 
Difficulty and Target Focus have a positive correlation with QTB, whereas Organizational 
Commitment, Fairness and Interactive Control have a negative correlation with QTB.  These 
relationships will be explored further in multi-variate analysis. 
 
XX TABLE 2 XX 
 
Table 3 shows the results from our regressions.  Columns (1) and (2) report the results for all 
observations for models 1 and 2.  Model 1 examines the main effects of the hypothesised 
variables, whilst model 2 adds variables for hierarchical level and division.   Both models 
explain just over 20% of the variance in QTB.  Columns (3) – (5) report the results for model 
2 by hierarchical level, columns (6) and (7) report the results for model 2 by division, and 
columns (8) and (9) report the results for model 2 by gender.  The more detailed models for 
subsets of the data have smaller sample sizes, and show explanatory levels varying from 13% 
to 36%.11   
 
XX TABLE 3 XX 
4.1 Impact of Target Level on QTB 
Recall from hypothesis 1, we expect to find a positive association between Target Difficulty 
and QTB.  However we find no support for this for the full sample (columns 1 and 2).  
However regression analysis by hierarchical level shows different behaviour.  We find that 
for Executives challenging targets are associated with less QTB (column 3), but for Managers 
challenging targets are associated with more QTB (column 4).  Perhaps as employees reach 
this point in the hierarchy it becomes harder to reach the target and engaging in QTB is a 
coping mechanism as targets are unattainable without it.  We find no significant effect for 
Senior Managers in our sample (column 5).  There is also no significant impact of Target 
Difficulty on QTB by division (column 6 and 7) although females are less likely to engage in 
QTB in response to challenging targets (column 8). 
                                                            
11 The explanatory power is comparable with previous studies examining QTB, although they use different 
instruments and variables; Otley and Pierce (1996a) report an R2 of 0.53, Malone and Roberts (1996) report an 




4.2 Impact of Target Focus in Performance Appraisal on QTB 
We expect a positive association between the level of Target Focus by superiors in 
performance appraisal and QTB (Hypothesis 2).  Our results show target focused evaluative 
style results in greater propensity to engage in QTB, as reflected in a positive and significant 
coefficient on Target Focus in models 1 and 2 (columns 1 and 2).  Examining each 
hierarchical level separately, we find the sign of Target Focus is positive across all levels, 
although it is only significant at the Executive level (column 3).  Therefore particularly 
adverse effects of Target Focus occur lower down the hierarchy.    
 
We find a significant positive association between Target Focus and QTB in both the audit 
and non-audit divisions.  Therefore, irrespective of division, target focused evaluative style 
engenders dysfunctional behaviour in subordinates (columns 7 and 8).  In addition, our 
analysis by gender finds a significant relationship for Target Focus.  Both male and female 
employees are associated with greater QTB in response to Target Focus, but males 
demonstrate a greater propensity for QTB in relation to Target Focus (0.159 vs. 0.100).  This 
is consistent with findings from previous literature (e.g. Pierce and Sweeney, 2010) which 
shows females exhibit higher ethical judgement than males. 
 
4.3 Impact of Organizational Commitment, Fairness and Interactive Control on QTB 
We expect greater Organizational Commitment, increased perceptions of Fairness and more 
Interactive Control reduce the level of QTB (Hypotheses 3 - 5).  Our results confirm this 
(columns 1 and 2).  The form of the relationship for Organizational commitment is consistent 
across hierarchical level, division and gender.  In the models estimated for Senior Managers, 
Audit and Females this effect is highly statistically significant (columns 5, 7 and 8).  The 
form of the relationship for Fairness is consistent across Executives and Managers, division 
and gender.  In addition, results show that the strength of this relationship is greatest at the 
Executive level in the organization (column 3).  We also find a greater impact of Fairness in 
audit (-0.184 vs -0.064) and for females (-0.129 vs -0.065).  In addition, greater interaction 
with superiors is associated with fewer QTB (hypothesis 5), but only significantly so for 
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Managers and Senior Managers (columns 4 and 5), in non-audit (column 6) and for females 
(column 8).12 
 
4.4 Impact of Hierarchical Level on QTB 
We make no directional prediction for the impact of hierarchical level on the relationships 
studied (Hypothesis 6).  In model 2 the results on the indicator variables for hierarchical level 
are insignificant.  Nevertheless our sub-sample results have demonstrated some interesting 
and statistically significant differences by hierarchical level.  To summarize, Executives are 
associated with fewer instances of QTB in response to challenging targets, but greater QTB if 
target-focussed performance appraisal is adopted (column 3).  Managers are more likely to 
engage in QTB to meet challenging targets (column 4), particularly those in the audit 
division, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on Manager (column 7).  In 
addition, Organizational Commitment appears more important at the Senior Manager level 
for reducing QTB (column 4).  Results estimated by gender would suggest female Directors 
are less likely to engage in QTB (column 8).  Therefore it would appear from our results that 
hierarchical level does affect how employees respond to performance management systems. 
 
4.5 Audit and Non-Audit Divisions 
We make no directional prediction for the impact of division of service on the relationships 
studied (Hypothesis 7).  Audit is insignificant in model 2, but in the model for Managers 
(column 4), Audit has a significant positive coefficient.  This suggests Managers in Audit 
undertake a greater level of QTB relative to the Non-audit division.13  We find no comparable 
effect for the other hierarchical levels.  This perhaps is due to pressure on managers to meet 




12 Since Organizational Commitment, Fairness and Interactive Control are negatively associated with QTB (see 
Table 2), we create a new variable, Overall Equity, which is a simple average of the twelve items for 
Organizational Commitment, Fairness and Interactive Control.  The Cronbach alpha for Overall Equity is 0.87 
and there is no significant difference in Overall Equity by hierarchical level, division or gender (see Table 1).  
The results (not tabulated) from models using Overall Equity in place of Organizational Commitment, Fairness 
and Interactive Control are consistent with those reported in Table 3 and Overall Equity is negative and highly 
significant in all model specifications. 
13 For each hierarchical level in the organization, we compute a two group mean test for differences in the mean 
level of QTB between the audit and non-audit divisions.  We find no evidence to suggest a statistically different 
level of QTB between the divisions at any hierarchical level: p-values were 0.3046 for Executives, 0.1804 for 
Managers, 0.8146 for Senior Managers and 0.5108 for Directors. 
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Results by division suggest that in the Audit division, increased target focus results in greater 
QTB, but increased Organizational Commitment and perceptions of Fairness are very 
important for reducing QTB.  In contrast, in the Non-Audit division, it is Organizational 
Commitment and Interactive Control which are important in reducing QTB.  This provides 
some preliminary evidence that there are some subtle differences in the divisions and 
employee responses to the performance management system, even in the same firm with the 
same culture and training route. 
 
4.6 Control variables: Age, Gender, Grade Tenure and Organization Tenure  
Age, Gender, Grade Tenure and Organization Tenure are included as control variables, but 
are all insignificant in models 1 and 2 (columns 1 and 2).  However, Grade Tenure is positive 
and significant for Executives (column 3), suggesting increased length of time in the role 
results in greater QTB.  Perhaps this shows that Executives who have been in post for a while 
learn what is thought of as acceptable behaviour and what they can ‘get away with’ in terms 
of cutting corners, or alternatively that they are not going to be promoted within the 
organization and ‘cut corners’ as a consequence.  Therefore as they become more 
experienced and are set ever increasing targets, Executives find it necessary to engage in QTB 
to keep meeting set targets.  We find no significant effect of Grade Tenure in other sample 
partitions, either by division or by gender.   Organization Tenure is also important for 
Executives and it appears a longer tenure with the organization is associated with lower QTB 
(column 3).   Age however is positive and significant for Executives and Females suggesting 
older Executives and older females are more likely to engage in QTB (columns 3 and 8).  
These control variables are not significant in any of our other model specifications. 
 
4.7 Further results 
We investigate the sensitivity of our results to our measure of Target Focus.  We adopt a 
measure comparable to Hopwood (1972) which contrasts short with long-term goals.  See 
Appendix for details of items.  Target Focus and Hopwood are positively correlated (r = 
0.38), see Table 2.  Our results (not tabulated) are comparable with those reported in Table 3, 
although significance of some coefficients of interest in some sub-regressions by hierarchical 




In addition, we re-examine each of the five items of QTB individually.14  The results for 
model (2) for all hierarchical levels are shown in Table 4.   
XX Table 4 XX 
Only under-reporting of time (QTB5) is significantly positively associated with Target 
Difficulty (column 5, Table 4).  All other elements of QTB are unaffected by the level of 
target assigned, inconsistent with hypothesis 1.  Target Focus is positively associated with 
each individual QTB except for skipping procedures (QTB4, column 4, Table 4).  The 
necessity to do a diligent job (and complete all necessary steps in an allocated task) prevails 
irrespective of the deadlines and focus of appraisers, as suggested by Herrbach (2001).  
However, for other aspects, greater focus on targets does lead to greater QTB by employees, 
suggesting excessive target focus leads to dysfunctional outcomes, consistent with hypothesis 
2. In terms of aspects which may mitigate QTB, Organizational Commitment is effective at 
reducing most types of QTB; it does not significantly influence presenteeism (QTB3, column 
3, Table 4), although this may be an important factor in showing the team and your superiors 
that you are working hard.  Fairness is influential in reducing the propensity for actions 
against better judgment (QTB2) and fewer instances of procedures being skipped (QTB4), 
which suggests this is an important factor in ensuring diligence in employees work.  Fairness 
is also an important factor in reducing presenteeism (QTB3), perhaps because employees feel 
less of a need to demonstrate their commitment if rewards and promotions are allocated 
fairly.  Interactive Control significantly reduces the likelihood of bad actions and skipping of 
necessary procedures (QTB2 and QTB4, columns 2 and 4, Table 4). 
 
Some differences by hierarchical level are apparent.  All indicators for hierarchical level are 
positive and significant in models examining short-term focus (QTB1) suggesting greater 
short-term focus as you go up the organization hierarchy (Table 4, column 1).   This is result 
is potentially a large concern as short-term focus is potentially very harmful for the 
organization, especially when it is people in more senior roles taking such actions perhaps to 
meet short-term incentive criteria for bonus payments.  Nonetheless, we are reassured to find 
that Directors are less likely to engage in activities against their better judgement (QTB2, 
                                                            
14 QTB1 is ‘taking actions that enhance short term performance even though it negatively impacts on long-term 
performance’.  QTB2 is ‘having to do things you feel are against your better judgement in the course of your 
work’.  QTB3 is ‘having to stay longer hours in the office to indicate you are working hard’, i.e. presenteeism.  
QTB4 is ‘feeling it necessary to avoid or skip a required procedure’.  QTB5 is ‘feeling I cannot record all the 
time I spend on specific work, project or job assignment’.   
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Column 2), perhaps because they are more aware of the consequences of doing so. We find 
that presenteeism (QTB3), the decision to skip necessary procedures (QTB4) and the under-
recording time (QTB5) are not significantly associated with hierarchical level.   
 
4.8 Summary 
In our analysis, surprisingly we find the level of challenge in targets set is not a key driver 
determining QTB at all hierarchical levels; the main effects of Target Difficulty on QTB are 
found for Managers given their pivotal position within the organization hierarchy.  Target 
focused evaluative style affects those lower down the organization hierarchy, and causes 
Executives in particular to do whatever they can to meet the desired level of performance.  
The employees at higher hierarchical levels seem less affected by Target Focus, perhaps 
because they have learnt to cope better with allocated tasks and this reduces the need to 
engage in QTB.  Alternatively, those that progress up the hierarchy may be just the more 
skilled employees who did not need to engage in QTB to meet the target at the Executive 
level and this could explain the lower amount of QTB at higher levels in the organization.  As 
Coram et al. (2003, p. 43) acknowledge, the incidence of QTB “does not mean that the audit 
opinion will be incorrect”, although it does increase the probability of an inappropriate 
decision.   Therefore firms should be concerned about the incidence of QTB.  Overall our 
study confirms the expectation that target focused evaluative style can be unproductive and 
may result in undesirable behaviours in employees.   
 
Our results also suggest Organizational Commitment, Fairness and Interactive Control are 
important factors which help to reduce QTB.  Organizational Commitment is particularly 
important in the decision to engage in QTB for Senior Managers and Executives, perhaps 
because they are seeking to remain in the organization and be promoted to the next 
hierarchical level.  Fairness of treatment is influential for Executives and Managers, 
suggesting firms may find it helpful to be more transparent in the allocation of more 
interesting and varied tasks, along with appropriate promotion processes and perceived equity 
in promotions between colleagues at similar points in their careers.  Somewhat inevitably, 
perceptions of inequitable treatment may lead to demotivation and greater QTB. For 
Managers and Senior Managers, Interactive Control is important suggesting greater contact 
with superiors may provide the opportunity for relationship building and lower likelihood of 
letting the team down by engaging in QTB.  These results confirm our expectation that 
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different mechanisms of performance management are important at different hierarchical 
levels. 
 
Focusing on the individual aspects of QTB, results show greater short-term focus (QTB1) 
higher up the organization hierarchy, although such short-term focussed behaviour may be 
mitigated by greater organizational commitment.  This is consistent with the view that an 
individual only bears the consequences of short-term focus if they remain within the 
organization in the longer term.  Actions which are against an individual’s better judgement 
(QTB2) are associated with more target focussed style of performance appraisal, although this 
does not have a significant impact on the level of necessary procedures skipped (QTB4).   
Nonetheless individual’s actions are more likely to be more congruent with the organization’s 
desired outcomes and fewer procedures are expected to be skipped where there is greater 
organizational commitment, accompanied with greater individual perceptions of fairness in 
allocated tasks and promotions, combined with greater interaction between junior and senior 
employees.  Presenteeism (QTB3) is more apparent with target-focussed appraisal styles, 
perhaps indicating a desire to demonstrate hard working tendencies to achieve a successful 
performance appraisal outcome.  However, if there is greater fairness in the allocation of 
tasks and awarding of promotions, the necessity to engage in presenteeism declines.  This 
may be better for ensuring work quality as employees will likely be less tired and stressed 
(Ng et al., 2007).  Under-reporting of time (QTB5) is positively associated with target 
difficulty and more target focussed performance appraisal styles, and only Organizational 
Commitment reduces the likelihood of under-reporting of time on tasks completed.   
 
Overall, it would appear that target-focussed appraisal styles are inappropriate in Big Four 
accounting firms as significant QTB is evidenced in response to this.  We find consistent 
evidence that interaction with junior employees, and perceptions of fairness and equity of 
treatment of employees is important at engendering good behaviour in subordinates, although 
the strength of this relationship differs by hierarchical level and by division.  In addition, 
organizational commitment is important to encourage less behaviour inconsistent with 






Our study examines the incidence of QTB in a Big Four UK accounting firm by using a web-
based questionnaire.  The QTB we examine are: (i) taking actions that are short-term focussed 
at the expense of long-term effectiveness, (ii) having to do things against an individual’s 
better judgement, (iii) presenteeism, (iv) feeling the need to avoid or skip a required 
procedure and (v) feeling unable to record the time taken on a particular task or assignment.  
We investigate the link between QTB and Target Difficulty, and the influence of target-
focused performance appraisal style on QTB. The role of an individual’s commitment to the 
organization, the level of fairness in assigned jobs and rewards, and the level of interaction 
with superiors on the level of QTB is also considered.  In addition differences in QTB across 
hierarchical level, and audit and non-audit divisions of the organization are examined.  This 
study has the advantage of including both audit and non-audit divisions of the professional 
firm, whereas previous studies have focussed solely on audit.  Whilst the audit division is 
important, it is not the only revenue stream of these firms and we have little knowledge of 
whether the behaviour documented in prior studies is applicable to both divisions.  In 
addition, to specifically examine the differential impact of hierarchical level we focus on all 
hierarchical levels in our study, which has not been done previously.   
 
Broadly, we expect more QTB if there are more challenging targets, and also if appraisers 
have more target focused evaluative style in performance appraisals.  In addition, we predict 
fewer instances of QTB if there is greater individual commitment to the organization, more 
perceptions of fairness of treatment in terms of promotion and allocated tasks, and more 
instances of face to face interactions with superiors.  The relationships identified are more 
complicated than originally envisaged at the outset of our study and from prior work.  We 
find that the hypothesised effects exist between Target Difficulty and QTB, and also the level 
of target focus of superiors and QTB, although they only apply to specific groups of 
employees, rather than being universal across all hierarchical levels.   Similarly, the impact of 
organizational commitment on reducing QTB differs by hierarchical level.  Interestingly the 
impact of interaction with juniors and perceptions of fairness and equity of treatment of 
employees is also important at engendering good behaviour in subordinates, although the 
strength of this relationship differs by hierarchical level and by division.   
 
Due to the anonymous nature of our web-survey, we were unable to raise follow up questions 
with respondents.  However we feel this was an important design feature to ensure the 
integrity of the data collected.  Nonetheless, we believe our study provides important insights, 
24 
 
which are generalizable to other regional offices in the Big Four accounting firm studied and 
other accounting firms.  The results from the non-audit section provide some insight into 
results which may be found in organizations other sectors which are subject to greater 
competitive pressure, although this must be investigated further by future studies. 
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Table 1: Variable Summary Statistics for the Full Sample and Sample Partitionsa 











Audit Audit Female Male  
Cronbach 
 
      N = 215   N = 89 N = 60 N = 52 N = 14 N = 124 N = 91 N = 85 N = 130   
QTB 1-5 1-4.6 2.60 0.66 2.54 2.72 2.65 2.2 2.61 2.58 2.61 2.59 0.6676 
Target Difficulty 1-7 1-7 4.06 1.31 3.71 4.32 4.17 4.71 4.09 4.01 3.81 4.22 
Target Focus  1-7 1-7 2.89 1.16 2.88 2.94 2.98 2.45 2.89 2.89 2.93 2.87 0.8064 
Org. Commitment 1-7 1-7 5.10 1.24 4.93 4.99 5.27 6.00 5.01 5.22 5.04 5.14 0.8301 
Fairness 1-7 1-6.8 4.22 1.17 4.23 4.19 4.16 4.59 4.23 4.22 4.19 4.24 0.8332 
Interactive Control 1-7 1-6.75 4.46 1.21 4.73 4.35 4.14 4.29 4.39 4.54 4.45 4.46 0.8634 
Overall Equity 1-7 1.92-6.58 4.52 0.94 4.57 4.44 4.43 4.84 4.48 4.57 4.49 4.54 0.8686 
Grade Tenure 1-9 1-9 3.01 2.00 2.27 3.08 4.13 3.29 3.39 2.51 3.25 2.86   
Org. Tenure 1-15 1-15 6.16 4.07 3.57 5.92 9.31 11.93 6.23 6.05 6.13 6.18  
Age 21-51 21-51 34.22 7.31 28.85 35.35 39.56 43.64 35.52 32.45 33.85 34.46  
Hopwood 0.14-7 0.31-4 0.93 0.33 0.93 0.99 0.87 0.86 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.90 0.6807 
Executive  = 1   41%      33% 52% 47% 38%  
Manager = 1   28%      33% 21% 27% 28%  
Senior Manager = 1   24%      28% 19% 22% 25%  
Director = 1   7%      6% 8% 4% 8%  
Audit = 1   42%  54% 32% 33% 50%   40% 44%  
Male = 1   60%  55% 62% 63% 79% 59% 63%    
aNote: Bold font indicates statistically significant difference within sample partitions (hierarchical level, division and gender) at 5% level or better. 
 
where: QTB is Quality Threatening Behaviour, the frequency of taking actions which could be considered quality threatening; Target Difficulty is the perceived difficulty of 
achieving assigned goals; Target Focus is the extent to which the assessor is focused upon targets in performance appraisal (i.e. budget constrained approach); Organizational 
Commitment is the level of commitment individual feels towards the organization; Fairness is the extent to which the individual feels they are treated fairly in performance 
appraisal and assignment of rewards, relative to others in the same role, Interactive Control  is the extent to which the supervisor has interactive approach; Overall Equity is a 
combination of Fairness, Organizational Commitment and Interactive Control; Grade Tenure is the length of time (in years) in the current grade/organizational role; 
Organization Tenure is length of time (in years) employed in the organization; Age is age (in years) of individual; Hopwood is an alternative measure of Target Focus 
Evaluative Style based upon Hopwood (1972).  Executive, Manager, Senior Manager and Director are dummy variables =1 if the individual is at the hierarchical level of 
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Executive, Manager, Senior Manager or Director respectively and 0 otherwise; Audit is a dummy variable for division = 1 if individual is in the audit division and 0 
otherwise.  Other divisions include tax and consultancy divisions; Male is a dummy variable for gender = 1 if male and 0 if female.  For further details of component 




Table 2: Variable correlations amongst continuous variables (N=215)b 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 QTB 1.00 
2 Target Difficulty 0.12 1.00 
3 Target Focus 0.35 0.15 1.00 
4 Org. Commitment -0.35 -0.12 -0.25 1.00 
5 Fairness -0.38 -0.12 -0.34 0.42 1.00 
6 Interactive Control -0.31 -0.22 -0.22 0.34 0.44 1.00 
7 Overall Equity -0.45 -0.19 -0.35 0.70 0.85 0.77 1.00 
8 Grade Tenure 0.05 -0.09 0.12 -0.04 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 1.00 
9 Org. Tenure -0.08 0.07 -0.13 0.13 0.03 -0.14 0.00 0.56 1.00 
10 Age 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.15 -0.06 0.55 0.59 1.00 
11 Hopwood 0.22 0.12 0.38 -0.18 -0.21 -0.01 -0.17 0.03 -0.05 0.01 1.00 




Table 3:  Results from Models Examining the Determinants of Quality Threatening Behaviourc 
Dependent variable: QTB 
  All Levels By Hierarchical Level By Division By Gender 
 Ex. 
sign 
All All Executives Managers Senior 
Managers 
Non-Audit Audit Female Male 
Column No.:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Target Difficulty (+) 0.005 0.003 -0.107 0.152 -0.075 0.042 -0.065 -0.060 0.033 
  (0.16) (0.09) (1.92)**  (3.22)*** (1.12) (1.05) (1.00) (1.33)* (0.76) 
Target Focus (+) 0.120 0.118 0.218 0.048 0.104 0.078 0.142 0.100 0.159 
  (3.07)*** (2.92)*** (3.00)*** (0.85) (0.91) (1.46)* (1.98)** (1.80)** (2.53)*** 
Org. Commitment (-) -0.095 -0.091 -0.073 -0.024 -0.199 -0.085 -0.111 -0.135 -0.058 
  (2.49)*** (2.37)*** (1.51)* (0.33) (2.20)** (1.58)* (1.98)** (2.90)*** (0.95) 
Fairness (-) -0.106 -0.107 -0.138 -0.101 0.022 -0.064 -0.184 -0.129 -0.065 
  (2.76)*** (2.87)*** (2.31)** (1.57)* (0.28) (1.27) (3.23)*** (2.10)** (1.21) 
Interactive Control (-) -0.066 -0.064 -0.064 -0.157 -0.088 -0.133 0.011 -0.118 -0.067 
  (1.55)* (1.54)* (0.98) (2.34)** (1.30)* (2.45)*** (0.18) (2.04)** (1.08) 
Manager (?)  0.140    -0.063 0.439 0.002 0.210 
   (1.19)    (0.42) (2.40)** (0.01) (1.22) 
Senior Manager (?)  0.094    0.006 0.204 -0.166 0.180 
   (0.65)    (0.03) (0.88) (0.71) (0.96) 
Director (?)  -0.208    -0.350 0.074 -0.662 0.018 
   (0.94)    (1.43) (0.20) (2.42)** (0.07) 
Audit (?)  0.036 -0.104 0.360 0.075   0.087 -0.009 
   (0.42) (0.78) (2.20)** (0.45)   (0.75) (0.08) 
Male (?) -0.008 -0.007 -0.029 0.086 0.054 0.055 -0.004   
  (0.10) (0.08) (0.23) (0.59) (0.27) (0.49) (0.03)   
Grade Tenure (?) -0.012 -0.019 0.090 0.028 -0.008 0.021 -0.021 -0.027 -0.014 
  (0.48) (0.77) (1.80)* (0.43) (0.16) (0.57) (0.52) (0.77) (0.36) 
Org. Tenure (?) -0.010 -0.007 -0.062 -0.024 -0.003 -0.025 -0.006 -0.011 -0.009 
  (0.88) (0.54) (1.80)* (0.73) (0.12) (1.43) (0.24) (0.49) (0.55) 
Age (?) 0.007 0.007 0.028 -0.001 -0.023 0.002 0.012 0.022 -0.000 
  (1.02) (0.85) (2.21)** (0.07) (1.19) (0.18) (0.90) (1.83)* (0.04) 
Intercept (?) 3.323 3.253 2.839 3.059 4.883 3.513 3.305 3.738 2.875 




F  6.94*** 5.75*** 13.48*** 4.69*** 1.65 4.16*** 3.94*** 7.42*** 2.67*** 
Adj. R2  0.22 0.22 0.35 0.30 0.13 0.23 0.23 0.36 0.13 
N  215 215 89 60 52 124 91 85 130 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (one-tailed tests where directional prediction is made and two-tailed tests otherwise) 
cNote: Models are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares regression methods with heteroskedastic robust standard errors.  t-statistics are reported in 





Table 4: Further Results Examining the Determinants of Specific Aspects of Quality Threatening Behaviourd 
Dependent Variable: QTB Items 1 – 5 as indicated by column heading. 
 Ex.  
Sign 
QTB1: Short Term 
Focus 







of Time  
Column No.:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Target Difficulty (+) -0.036 0.014 0.003 -0.047 0.080 
  (0.64) (0.30) (0.05) (0.93) (1.41)* 
Target Focus (+) 0.096 0.122 0.155 0.056 0.160 
  (1.40)* (2.30)** (2.15)** (0.90) (2.38)*** 
Org. Commitment (-) -0.115 -0.092 -0.048 -0.110 -0.091 
  (1.78)** (1.81)** (0.72) (2.15)** (1.33)* 
Fairness (-) -0.081 -0.143 -0.162 -0.093 -0.055 
  (1.22) (2.64)*** (2.29)** (1.69)** (0.78) 
Interactive control (-) -0.074 -0.072 0.020 -0.159 -0.033 
  (1.14) (1.45)* (0.29) (2.56)*** (0.47) 
Manager (?) 0.334 0.197 -0.030 -0.004 0.205 
  (1.86)* (1.19) (0.14) (0.02) (1.02) 
Senior Manager (?) 0.583 0.000 0.030 0.102 -0.243 
  (2.63)*** (0.00) (0.12) (0.41) (0.81) 
Director (?) 0.634 -0.545 -0.272 -0.391 -0.468 
  (1.87)* (1.94)* (0.70) (1.17) (0.99) 
Audit (?) 0.167 0.094 -0.089 0.198 -0.192 
  (1.25) (0.78) (0.56) (1.56) (1.32) 
Male (?) -0.056 0.002 -0.191 0.357 -0.145 
  (0.43) (0.02) (1.25) (2.98)*** (0.98) 
Grade Tenure (?) 0.012 -0.010 0.018 -0.042 -0.075 
  (0.28) (0.27) (0.39) (1.07) (1.39) 
Org. Tenure (?) -0.011 0.004 -0.041 0.009 0.002 
  (0.48) (0.22) (1.48) (0.38) (0.09) 
Age (?) 0.012 0.004 -0.006 -0.003 0.027 
  (0.92) (0.39) (0.38) (0.28) (1.82)* 
Intercept (?) 2.997 3.178 3.691 3.743 2.658 
  (5.00)*** (5.75)*** (5.36)*** (6.17)*** (3.90)*** 
F  3.72*** 4.66*** 3.12*** 4.97*** 3.42*** 
Adj. R2  0.13 0.19 0.09 0.15 0.09 
N  215 215 215 215 215 
34 
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (one-tailed tests where directional prediction is made and two-tailed tests otherwise) 
dNote: Models are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares regression methods with heteroskedastic robust standard errors for all hierarchical levels.  
t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions are as per Table 1 except for the dependent variable which comprises the five different 
elements of Quality Threatening Behaviour.  QTB1 is ‘taking actions that enhance short term performance even though it negatively impacts on long-
term performance’; QTB2 is ‘having to do things you feel are against your better judgement in the course of your work’; QTB3 is ‘having to stay 
longer hours in the office to indicate you are working hard’; QTB4 is ‘feeling it necessary to avoid or skip a required procedure’ and QTB5 is ‘feeling 
I cannot record all the time I spend on specific work, project or job assignment’.  Further details of the underlying items of quality threatening 






APPENDIX: Relevant Questions Reproduced from Survey Questionnaire 
 
This appendix shows the questions used in our study for the underlying variable constructs.  For each construct where we are using more than 
one question, we validate our inclusion of the question using confirmatory factor analysis and Cronbach alpha.   
 
Quality Threatening Behaviour (QTB)  
QTB is assessed using five measurement items which are increasing in QTB.  We include a composite variable which is a simple average of the 
five items, as well as completing analysis for the five items individually.  The items are based upon items from prior literature (Anthony and 
Govindarjaran, 2004; Otley and Pierce, 1995; 1996b; Sweeney and Pierce, 2006).   The Cronbach alpha of QTB is 0.6676. 
 
Measurement Scale: Frequency of Behaviour (1 = Never, 5 = Almost Always) Mean Std. Dev % Scores > 2 
Listed below are pressures some people in other organizations claim to have experienced in 
their jobs.  To what extent have you experienced these in your current job? 
   
1.     Taking actions that enhance short-term performance of the firm even though it 
negatively impacts long-term performance. [QTB1] 
2.56 0.96 52% 
2.     Having to do things you feel are against your better judgement in the course of your 
work. [QTB2] 
2.38 0.86 40% 
3.     Having to stay longer hours in the office to indicate you are working hard. [QTB3] 2.75 1.12 58% 
4.     Feeling it necessary to avoid or skip a required procedure. [QTB4] 2.17 0.93 33% 
5.     Feeling I cannot record all the time I spend on a specific work, project, or job 
assignment. [QTB5] 
3.13 1.12 71% 
 
Target Focus  
This instrument is developed specifically for this study to focus on the balance between quantitative and qualitative information in performance 
appraisal, along with target focused evaluative style, and the importance of other information in performance appraisal.  We find that some of the 
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items do not load in factor analysis and therefore our measure is based upon items 4-6.  The first two items (4 and 5) used in our measure are 
reverse coded to ensure they are increasing in target focus of the appraiser.  Then target focus is a simple average of the three items.   The 
Cronbach alpha of Target Focus is 0.8064. 
 
Measurement Scale: Strength of Agreement (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) Mean Std. Dev % Scores > 4 
Thinking about your last annual performance review (even if you have not yet had an annual 
appraisal), please indicate the extent to which you agree with the statements below: 
  
* 1.  My appraiser mainly uses quantitative information (e.g. financial, time and deadline 
targets) in evaluating my performance  
3.61 1.61 30% 
* 2.  My appraiser mainly uses qualitative information (e.g. quality of work done) in 
evaluating my performance 
4.92 1.49 65% 
* 3.  My appraiser uses qualitative and quantitative information in equal proportions in 
evaluating  my performance 
3.73 1.78 33% 
4.    My appraiser is more concerned with my overall performance than with not meeting 
specific goals in the short-term. [R] 
4.89 1.43 70% 
5.    Normally my appraiser expects me to meet my goals but accepts good reasons for any 
shortfalls in performance. [R] 
5.00 1.26 72% 
6.    My appraiser expects me to meet my goals and is unwilling to accept explanations for 
any shortfalls in meeting them.  
2.57 1.42 10% 
*7.   My rewards depend mainly on information other than how well I meet my specific 
goals 
4.35 1.57 47% 
*8.   My rewards depend mainly on how well I met my goals 3.77 1.56 37% 
*9.   My rewards depend equally on how well I meet my goals and on non-goal related 
information 
3.94 1.56 36% 






Organizational Commitment  
The instrument used for Organizational Commitment is based upon Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979).  We find the first item does not load on 
to the factor appropriately and therefore organizational commitment is an average of the remaining three items.  The Cronbach alpha of 
Organizational Commitment is 0.8301. 
Measurement Scale: Strength of Agreement (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) Mean Std. Dev % Scores > 4 
*1.   Within my role, I would accept almost any type of work, project or job assignment in 
order to keep working for this organization 
3.65 1.77 34% 
2.     I am extremely glad that I chose this organization to work for over others that I was 
considering at the time I joined.  
5.35 1.31 76% 
3.     I really care about the future of this organization.  5.03 1.52 71% 
4.     I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to 
help this organization be successful.  
4.92 1.45 68% 
*Question that did not load appropriately in factor analysis 
 
Fairness  
The instrument used for Fairness is based upon Janssen (2001).  All items load positively on to the same factor.  Fairness is calculated as an 
average of the five items.  The Cronbach alpha for Fairness is 0.8332. 
Measurement Scale: Strength of Agreement (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) Mean Std. Dev % Scores > 4 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
1.    The rewards I receive are appropriate to the effort I put into my work.  3.92 1.63 41% 
2.    I give a great deal of time and attention to the organization, and this is appreciated.  4.17 1.4 43% 
3.    I feel I am fairly treated by my employer regarding allocation of work, projects and job 
assignments.  4.62 1.43 59% 
4.    I feel I am fairly treated by my employer regarding promotion and advancement 
opportunities.  4.31 1.5 49% 
5.    I feel I am fairly treated by my employer regarding my compensation (salary awards and 







Interactive Control  
This is a new instrument based upon ideas from Simons (1995), Abernerthy and Brownell (1999) and Chenhall (2003).  All four items load 
positively on to the same factor and Interactive control is calculated as an average of all four items.  The Cronbach alpha for Interactive Control 
is 0.8634. 
 
Measurement Scale: Strength of Agreement (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) Mean Std. Dev % Scores > 4 
Thinking of the way in which performance information is used, please indicate the extent to 
which you agree with the following statements.  Information about my performance against 
agreed objectives/targets... 
  
1.     Is the subject of face-to-face discussions with my appraiser whether or not my 
performance diverges from the agreed objectives/targets.  
5.15 1.44 71% 
2.     Is used by my appraiser mainly to encourage me to continually seek information and 
ways of improving my performance.  
4.69 1.38 62% 
3.     Is the subject of my appraiser’s regular and frequent attention. 3.76 1.43 32% 
4.     Is used by my appraiser to encourage and inspire me, and to facilitate my development.  4.22 1.51 50% 
 
Target Focus Evaluative Style Hopwood  
Our other measure of Target Focus is based on Hopwood (1972).  Target Focus Hopwood compares the long and short term goals.  In our study, 
this is measured as ([Item 3 x 2]) / (Item 1 + Item 4).  The Cronbach alpha for Hopwood is 0.6807. 
 
Measurement Scale: Strength of Importance (1 = Not at all important, 7 = Very Important) Mean Std. Dev % Scores > 4 
Listed below are some criteria that people in other businesses have indicated to be important 
in their appraiser’s evaluation of their performance.  Please indicate how important you 
believe each criterion is in your appraiser’s evaluation of your performance (even if you 
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have not yet had an annual appraisal). 
1.       How well I communicate and build relationships with colleagues and clients 5.74 1.22 89% 
2.       How well I get along with my appraiser. 4.65 1.35 56% 
3.       How well I met my goals and deadline targets. 5.20 1.34 81% 
4.       The quality of my work. 5.86 1.16 90% 
5.       My actions that produce long-run effectiveness rather than short-run results. 4.76 1.43 62% 
6.       How much effort my appraiser perceives I put into the job. 5.36 1.17 79% 
7.       How long I have been in my current position. 3.37 1.56 23% 
#8.       Are there any others?  (Please list.) 6.04 0.96 93% 
# Note: Only 28 of the 215 respondents provided an answer to this question. 
 
 
 
 
